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3
Investigating Digital Crime
Ian Kennedy
Digital forensics is a relatively recent addition to the forensics family and, for this
reason alone, the terminology used is undergoing constant definition and redefini-
tion. An increasing number of books are available with titles that make reference
to terms such as ‘cyberforensics’, ‘computer forensics’, ‘Windows forensics’
and ‘Intrusion forensics’. As we shall see throughout this chapter, not only is
the terminology in a state of development but the training and accreditation is
changing too.
Hi-tech crime is often associated with computers and especially with the
investigation of paedophiles. Whilst this may reflect the current caseload of
many law enforcement high tech (or hi-tech) crime units around the UK, it is
becoming increasingly common for digital devices other than personal com-
puters to be either the target of a crime, or to be used to assist in the com-
mission of a crime. Mobile phones, digital cameras, personal data assistants
(PDAs), mp3 players, and even online storage are currently the technologies
of choice for the technically savvy criminal. Digital forensics therefore, extends
beyond the confines of the computer and encompasses a broad range of digital
technology.
Investigating Digital Crime Edited by Robin Bryant and Sarah Bryant
C© 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd
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50 CH 3 INVESTIGATING DIGITAL CRIME
Evidence and intelligence in digital crime
Robin Bryant
Evidence and intelligence are both forms of information that may be used in
an enquiry and a subsequent prosecution.
e.g.
emails
e.g.
information
from an 
informant
e.g.
eye-witness
statements
Intelligence Evidence
Figure 3.1 Intelligence and evidence
Intelligence is information which, when analysed and interpreted, is of
potential value in progressing an enquiry into an alleged, suspected or actual
crime. Information from a paid informant for example might constitute intel-
ligence. Evidence, in comparison, is any information which may be of value
to a court in deciding on the issues presented to them, most fundamentally on
the guilt or innocence of the accused. For a digital crime, recovered parts of
an email communication might constitute intelligence and evidence. Not all
intelligence will be used as evidence (for example, a recovered deleted SMS
communication may suggest a certain line of enquiry), and not all evidence
is intelligence (for example, a statement that a witness makes in court). Leg-
islation in the UK governing the collection of intelligence and evidence is
extensive.
There are many potential sources of digital crime evidence and intelli-
gence, and some are shown in tables 3.1 and 3.2 below. One unusual require-
ment for the work of a forensic digital investigator is a broad familiarity with
technology, both ancient and modern. For example it is perfectly feasible
that a criminal has continued to use his or her reliable Amstrad PCW word-
processor to this day. For this reason, police high tech crime units sometimes
include impressive repositories of knowledge about defunct computer and
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INVESTIGATING DIGITAL CRIME 51
word processing equipment. Many types of office and domestic electrical
equipment contain digital memory, and at least some may provide intel-
ligence or even evidence to support an investigation. The list in table 3.1
(below) reflects the wide range of equipment that may be used by offenders.
Table 3.1 Sources of digital information
Sources Examples
Hard drives ‘Winchester’ drives, tape drives, IDE drives (2.5 inch, 3.5 inch,
5.25 inch), SCSI drives, ATA drives, DMA drives and external
drives.
Discs, tapes,
cartridges
and pens
Floppy discs (relatively common 3.5in, less common 4.5in,
5.25in); Zip drive cartridges; Jaz drive cartridges; tapes for
external tape drives; CD (including miniCD); DVD (including
miniDVD, HDDVD, Blu-ray); USB flashdrives (pens or
memory sticks).
Network
devices,
modems
and routers
Servers; Network Interface (NIC) cards; internal, external,
PCMIA card modems; routers (including wireless routers).
Also included under this heading would be the associated
software e.g. the configuration file for a home modem/router.
Memory cards Used in a variety of devices, including digital cameras and
laptops. Memory cards include Memory Sticks, Multimedia
Cards (MMC), CompactFlash (CF), SmartMedia and Secure
Digital (SD, miniSD).
Computer access
control devices
These devices include stripe (swipe) cards, dongles, smartcards,
keycards, fingerprint recognition pads. Most are a combination
of hardware with software. These devices may elicit
information concerning the users of the devices.
Volatile memory Dumped RAM (including passwords and passphrases), state of
open network connections.
Personal media
players
Included here are ‘Walkmans’ (cassette, minidisc and CD), mp3
players, multimedia players (e.g. an Archos). Some of these
devices (such as an mp3 player) can also save non-music data
such as image files.
Recording
machines
(sound)
Tape machines include: reel-to-reel tape machines; cassette recorders players (tapes in C30, C45 and C60
sizes); answer machines (smaller tape cassettes); hand held recorders.
Some of these machines may have been used to record data
(e.g. from a Sinclair Spectrum).
CD players/recorders.
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Table 3.1 (Continued)
Sources Examples
Digital cameras and
camcorders
As well as the images themselves (with date stamps etc.),
digital camera memory is also normally able to store other
forms of data.
Recording machines
(linked to TVs)
VHS video players/recorders. DVD players/recorders (a DVD
player may be used to show digital photographs from a USB
pen).
Mobile phones,
electronic
organisers, PDAs
and smart devices
Including numerous mobile phone makes; Psion, iPAQ, Apple
Newton, Palm Pilot, Blackberry, Trio and i-phone. Pagers,
although no longer used by the public in the UK, might still
contain useful contact information.
GPS devices Including GPS devices within cars and hand-held devices
(including within mobile phones).
Office equipment ‘Telex’ machines, fax machines, scanners, printers,
photocopiers may all have residual memory information.
Games consoles NES, SNES, Playstation etc. For example a ‘chipped’ Microsoft
Xbox may have been set up as an ftp server, or a games
console may have been used to take part in a chat room.
TV and radio Digital TVs, digital satellite TV receivers, digital radios
White goods Microwave cookers and washing machines.
Others Digital clocks and watches.
3.1 Digital evidence
Quite apart from the legal position on digital evidence, conveying the significance
of the evidence itself to the court presents a particular challenge. It is not enough
to simply translate technical data into layman’s terms as one might translate a
foreign language into English. The technical complexity of such cases frequently
surpasses the technical knowledge and experience of the court. Some items of
evidence may simply seem intangible to a court due to their ‘virtual’ nature
or their confusing similarity to other items of evidence. For example, consider
trying to explain the difference between the last access date and the last modified
date on an NTFS file system.
Thus, unlike a written document, raw computer evidence must be presented
alongside an accurate interpretation which clearly identifies its significance in the
context of where it was found. For example, the hard disk of a computer contains
raw binary data, and ignoring more complex data types, this may be encoded as
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3.1 DIGITAL EVIDENCE 53
simple binary, binary coded decimal or as hexadecimal data. The value encoded
may represent a numeric, alphanumeric, date/time or logical value. Even dates
and times can be encoded in a number of ways employing, for example, a ‘big
endian’ or ‘little endian’ approach in terms of representation.
The interpretation of evidence must be undertaken by a suitably qualified person
and then presented in an accessible form for perusal by a court. Over simplifica-
tion is dangerous as it could lead to the data becoming open to interpretation. Any
doubt as to the interpretation of a single item of evidence can often be addressed
by correlating it with other evidence such as log files, internet history, and link
files.
Unlike some conventional crime scenes, the very existence of evidence may
not be obvious to the ‘first responder’ (the first person to arrive) at a digital crime
scene. It is not likely that there will be easily identifiable items of evidence such
as footprints or bloodstains to be identified and preserved. Conventional forensics
follows the ethos of Locard’s exchange principle as described by Thornton (1997);
namely ‘Every contact leaves a trace’. Akin to evidence such as DNA, digital
evidence is also fragile and easily contaminated or damaged. Every click of
the mouse could potentially alter data stored on a device and thus destroy vital
evidence. Thus, a first responder must not switch on a computer, or ‘have a look
around’ on a machine that is already running, as this threatens the integrity of the
evidence contained on the computer. Such integrity was debased recently (BBC,
2007g) by a Special Branch detective who breached standard police procedure
when he switched on a laptop computer and explored its contents (for over an
hour) prior to passing it over to a forensic computer analyst for examination.
Digital forensic investigation in context
Robin Bryant
For a digital forensic investigation to be successful, several different perspec-
tives need to be taken into account, and the three most important consider-
ations are shown in figure 3.2.
For example, examining the image of a SIM card from a mobile phone
cannot be regarded as simply a scientific process (the Scientific Disciplines
perspective). The examination is taking place because of an investigation
(the Law Enforcement perspective) with all that follows from this; possibly
in order to corroborate an account for the purpose of furthering an enquiry.
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For the enquiry to lead to a successful prosecution, the perspective of the
Criminal Justice System (and in particular, the CPS) must also be considered
e.g. ACPO principles must have been adhered to, particularly in relation to
evidential requirements.
SCIENTIFIC
DISCIPLINES
(e.g. Forensic Science, 
Computer Science)
LAW
ENFORCEMENT
(e.g. the police)
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM
(e.g. the CPS)
DIGITAL
FORENSIC
INVESTIGATION
Figure 3.2 Factors impinging on a digital forensic investigation
3.2 How a digital device becomes involved in a crime
Although many crimes committed with the use of a computer may seem to be
quite modern, they often include a number of features that may be somewhat
more traditional in nature. Using eBay, for example, to offer goods for sale,
receive payment and then fail to supply the goods to the customer is essentially
a traditional fraud; an old crime committed using a high tech method. Aspects of
the same offence can be committed using a newspaper advert or even a handshake
with an exchange of cash in the local pub. It is debated elsewhere in this book
just how ‘new’ these forms of criminality really are.
Not all crimes committed using a digital device use it simply as a means to an
end. A denial of service (DoS) attack on a website, or the intentional distribution
of a virus designed to manipulate data stored on a victim’s computer are both
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examples of crimes in which the computer itself is the target of the crime; the
computer has not simply been used in the commission of the offence.
There are numerous ways in which a digital device may feature within a crime.
Some particular examples are discussed in this section.
3.2.1 Fraud and identity theft
The Advance Fee or ‘419’ fraud is a popular confidence trick frequently per-
petrated by West African organised crime networks. The 419 reference is taken
from the section of the Nigerian Criminal Code relating to Fraud (International
Centre for Nigerian Law, 2007). It is a particularly old form of attempted fraud
that dates back to the 16th century when it was known as the ‘Spanish Prisoner’
scam, but its commission is most certainly facilitated through the use of digital
technology. Put simply, the scam involves a victim being offered a large sum of
money, but in order to access this money the victim must pay a fee in advance.
The reasons cited for this are varied but one example is to pay some form of
tax to an organisation holding the money. Further requests for payment are then
subsequently made until the victim realises what is happening at which point the
scammer stops all correspondence and disappears. Figure 3.3 shows a more subtle
variant of this scam; a request for money is likely to follow shortly!
Phishing is another modern twist on an old crime. Contacting victims electron-
ically via email, the scammers use social engineering techniques, and masquer-
ade as a legitimate organisation. The organisations of choice are currently eBay,
PayPal and certain high street banks. In a recent high profile attack the website
Monster.com had a number of its recruiter accounts compromised, and these
accounts were then used to log in and obtain the personal details of candidates.
Candidate data was then uploaded to a remote server whcih eventually held over
1.6 million entries (Symantec Corporation, 2007a) containing personal informa-
tion belonging to several hundred thousand candidates, mainly based in the US,
who had posted their résumés to the Monster.com website.
Typically, the potential phishing victim is sent an email purportedly from the
legitimate organisation with a link to its website that, when visited, superficially
looks genuine. The victim is then asked to log in to ‘verify’ their security details. In
some cases additional details such as credit card and corresponding PIN numbers
are also requested. Manipulating people into divulging confidential information
in this way is more of a problem than one might presume. Dhamija et al. (2006)
recently completed a study that showed 40 per cent of a test group failed to spot
phishing sites while the most sophisticated site fooled 90 per cent of the group.
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Figure 3.3 A variant of the 419 scam
As noted in an earlier chapter of this book, the recently updated Fraud Act 2006
includes an amendment to Section 2, fraud by false representation. The Explana-
tory Notes (Great Britain. Office of Public Sector Information, 2006) state that
anyone engaging in the act of phishing is guilty of fraud by false representation.
Using phishing techniques to obtain confidential information has recently led
to a number of cases of identity theft. This is the practice of using personal details
from another person to open bank accounts, and obtain credit cards, loans, state
benefits and documents such as passports and driving licences in a victim’s name.
Recent cases include a woman who impersonated her sister’s identity to obtain
a mortgage (BBC, 2007f), a university tutor who stole nearly £20 000 on two credit
cards he had taken out in the name of his former landlords (BBC, 2007h) and a
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man who headed a £2.3m identity theft ring targeting the bank accounts of a vicar,
businessmen and even the dead (BBC, 2007b). Garlik (2007) recently published
a report indicating that during 2006 there were 92 000 cases of reported online
identity theft and, it was claimed that 40 per cent of these were committed online.
A recent report by security firm Symantec (2007b) indicated that its software
alone had been used to block 12.5 million phishing emails per day over the first
six months of 2007.
3.2.2 Computer misuse
For computer misuse offences, both the offence and the method used to com-
mission the offence involve computers. The Computer Misuse Act 1990 was
established to legislate against offenders who gain unauthorised access to com-
puter systems, possibly with intent to commit further offences or modify any
data contained on the target computer system. This is discussed in more detail in
Chapter 2.
Computer misuse offences include:
 accessing areas of a competitor’s website without authorisation and download-
ing a large amount of internal information; sending a large number (millions) of emails to a former employer’s email server
causing a system crash, known as a Denial of Service or ‘DoS’ attack; writing and distributing computer viruses and inciting others to spread computer
viruses.
There were 144 500 reported cases of computer misuse (excluding malware) alone
during 2006, and it has been estimated that over 6 000 000 unreported malware
incidents are likely to have occurred in the same year (Garlik, 2007) Malware is
discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
Another area of emerging computer crime is that of an offender connecting
to a victim’s Wi-fi connection without permission. A recent case reported by the
BBC (2007d) highlights that such dishonesty in obtaining free internet access is
an offence under the Communications Act 2003 and a potential breach of the
Computer Misuse Act 1990. This type of activity is discussed in more detail in
Chapter 8.
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3.2.3 Sexual offences
It has been estimated that some 850 000 sexual approaches are likely to have
been made to children over the internet during 2006 (Garlik, 2007). Such offences
are found to occur primarily as a result of an offender visiting searching and/or
browsing websites, newsgroups or peer to peer networks. The receipt (and in some
cases distribution) of email and media such as CD-ROMs may also constitute an
offence. In some cases webcam technology has been used in combination with
grooming to make an indecent image of a child.
Grooming is the act of an adult communicating with a child with the intention
of meeting with the child to commit a further, often sexual, offence. O’Connell
(2007) identifies five stages of the grooming process:
1. Friendship. In this initial stage flattery is used by the adult to encourage the
child into talking in a private chatroom where they will be isolated. It is common
for a non-sexual picture of the child to be requested.
2. Forming a relationship. The child is asked what problems they have. This
creates the illusion of the adult being their best friend.
3. Risk assessment. To assess the risk of being detected the adult will at this stage
often ask the child about the location of their computer and who else has access
to it.
4. Exclusivity. With the friendship and risk level established, the groomer then
embarks on a process of building up a sense of mutual love and trust with the
child. A sense of complete non-judgemental friendship is established, giving
the child the feeling they can discuss ‘anything’.
5. Sex talk. In the final stage, explicit conversations are initiated with the child.
Frequently too, the child is asked to supply sexually explicit pictures of them-
selves. At this stage too, the paedophile will usually try to arrange a meeting
with the child.
The offender has a wide range of choice; the means of performing this type of
offence are rich and varied. Conventional chat sessions such as MSN and Yahoo
Messenger (with or without the use of a webcam) are relatively simple to set up
as no ‘profile’ is required to initiate a chat session. Social networking websites
such as www.bebo.com and www.facebook.com generally require the user to
create a profile before initiating contact with other users, but the details required
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for the profile are usually minimal and easily falsified. The sense of anonymity
often experienced by offenders using the internet gives them the confidence to
perform actions that they might consider unthinkable in real world. These issues
are explored in more detail in Chapter 10.
3.2.4 Mobile phones
Recent advances in mobile phone technology have created mobile phones that
include a digital camera. Increased memory capacity, removable memory cards,
higher still picture resolution and the ability to store several minutes of video
footage inevitably make the mobile phone an attractive and portable option for
many people, a few of whom will choose to use it to commit offences.
Guardian news and Media Limited (2007) report a number of teenagers arrested
for example, for using mobile phones to take indecent images of other children.
The BBC (2007a) reports that a barrister too has fallen foul of this technology by
allegedly using a mobile phone camera to take covert pictures of girls on trains.
The act of ‘happy slapping’ is another example of a modern twist on an old
crime, reports Guardian news and Media Limited (2005). This is the act of
committing an assault or robbery while an accomplice records the act, often with
a mobile phone. Sexual assaults (BBC, 2007e) and even murder (BBC, 2007c)
have also been recorded in this manner.
3.3 Forensic examination in practice
The precise procedure used for the examination of a digital device is of vital impor-
tance. Aside from the accreditation issues discussed later, there are no nationally
agreed standards, rules or protocol for the handling of computer evidence. There
are certainly ACPO guidelines for the handling of such evidence, but they are
little more than best practice advice.
From a prosecution point of view a forensic examination of a digital device is
generally considered to be conducted in four primary stages:
 acquisition; identification; evaluation; and presentation.
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The acquisition stage is concerned with the forensically sound capture of the data.
A digital device involved in a crime is effectively a crime scene in its own right
which needs to be secured, just as much as a murder scene. Like fingerprint and
DNA evidence, digital evidence is fragile and easily lost if appropriate precautions
are not followed. Horror stories of over-zealous police officers switching on digital
cameras to look for evidence or conducting virus scans on floppy disks prior to
submitting them for a forensic examination still haunt investigators working in the
field. The location in which the exhibit was found and seized is also an important
factor to record as it can reveal a great deal about the intent of the suspected
offender. For example, was the wireless device hidden beneath floorboards, or
was it in an open access area like a living room?
One of the most important aspects of the acquisition stage is the process of
forensically copying the data from the digital device onto an ‘evidence disk’.
The accepted best practice to achieve this is to use a hardware write-blocking
device. The device is installed between the evidence disk and the forensic
workstation, and only allows data to pass in one direction. It is designed to stop
any write signals being passed from the receiving computer back to the evidence
disk, hence preserving the data contained on the evidence disk in its original
form.
Data recovery from hard drives
Robin Bryant
Digital forensic investigation frequently involves the recovery of digital in-
formation from PCs, PDAs, mobile phones, GPS devices and indeed just
about any device with electronic memory. Some of these may contain mem-
ory in the form of a hard drive and the device may also employ a Win-
dows GUI interface. In terms of digital forensics, files and folders on a hard
drive can be thought of as falling into one of four different categories (our
terminology):
‘Obvious’ These are files and folders which are obviously either part of the
operating system (e.g. MS Word), or files (such as an MS Word
document) which have been saved by a particular program. Some
of these are certainly of potential interest to the digital forensic in-
vestigator. For example, one useful folder in Windows XP might
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be found in the folder C:\Documents and Settings\User\Local
Settings\Temporary Internet Files. This folder contains infor-
mation concerning internet sites visited with dates and times.
‘Obscure’ These are files and folders which, although not necessarily hid-
den (by the user or by the default setting of the GUI), do not
have an obvious meaning or use. Examples include ‘temp’ files
which may have the format ‘*.tmp’ where * is a wildcard (e.g.
∼WRL0554.tmp). For example, when using MS Word, copies of
the document are often saved as *.tmp files which can usually be
read as a document, by either changing the file extension to ‘doc’
or by associating MS Word with the file extension. (Although, in
practice, an alternative program to the original would probably
be used in a forensic investigation to examine the file, in order
to avoid modifying the original.)
‘Hidden’ These are files and folders which, although still present and intact
on the hard drive, are hidden from the user. They will not even be
revealed by ticking the ‘Show hidden files and folders’ checkbox
within the normal Windows routine.
‘Deleted’ These are files which have either been deliberately deleted by
the user (for example, in Windows, by sending a file to the ‘Re-
cycle Bin’ and then emptying the bin) or have been automatically
deleted, perhaps on booting up. A fundamental premise of the
forensic recovery of deleted data is that it is actually surprisingly
difficult for a person to completely and irretrievably delete a
file. Unless special software is used, or particular command line
actions taken, the likelihood is that at least part of the deleted
file is actually still present on the hard drive (particularly with
more modern PCs with large capacity hard drives).
However, note that there are also other ‘file residues’ that may be located,
such as ambient data, file slack, free space, and shadow data. The ‘page file’ is
possibly the most important type of ambient data. Page files are found with all
Windows operating systems as a form of electronic ‘scratch pad’ to write data
when additional random access memory is needed and may contain logon
names, passwords and fragments of messages and documents. Most users are
unaware of the existence of the page file. Other areas containing file or folder
details include registry, thumb.db files, email attachments and event logs.
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The recovery of obscure, hidden and deleted files is usually one of the
tasks of a digital forensic investigator. As an example consider the forensics
of retrieving information concerning a person’s use of the internet from an
image of their PC’s hard drive. Apart from examining obvious and obscure
files and folders and attempting the recovery of deleted files, the investiga-
tor would also probably access a hidden folder called ‘content.ie5’ which
contains a file called ‘index.dat’. This file records information about any
websites visited, and (unusually) is not deleted by clearing the temporary
internet files from folders. The content of the .ie5 folder and index.dat file
will not be made visible using the usual Windows ‘Show hidden files and
folders’ tab. It will be made visible however, by running the command <dir/
a “%Userprofile%\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\*.*” >. (Dedi-
cated forensically validated software is commercially available for this pro-
cedure, and in addition provides a user-friendly interface for collecting the
information).
In the identification stage, the precise location of relevant digital data must
be established. A computer with two hard disks, for example, can be initially
considered at a physical level in terms of a base unit, disk 1 and disk 2. Examples
of the properties that are of interest from this perspective are the system date and
time on the base unit, the number of sectors on both disks and whether any hidden
sectors reside on either disk. At a logical level, the number and type of partitions
present, and the type and structure of the file system are also of interest; they
may reveal much about the owner’s level of knowledge. Finally, the identification
stage considers the context within which any evidence is found. A good example
of this is when a particular credit card number (significant within an investigation)
is found in the area of a hard disk where previous files once resided, known as
unallocated clusters. Here, ghosts of former files reside in part or even in full and
these may be used to identify the original context of the credit card number; for
instance, was the card number in the content of an email? This may be crucial if
the evidence is to be exhibited for use in court.
In the evaluation stage a decision on the relevance of the find is made. A clear
understanding is required of how the data was produced, when it was produced
and by whom. It is at this stage that the common defence of Trojans and pop-ups in
internet browsing-related offences can be discounted through the examination of
any malware found on the device, live port activity and internet searching habits,
for example.
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The presentation stage involves the interpretation of the raw data and the re-
construction of events that occurred on the exhibit prior to its seizure. The report
must be technically concise, but clearly written for the lay person if it is to be un-
derstood by the court. The author of the report must be prepared to be questioned
and perhaps even defend their findings in a court of law.
3.3.1 Best practice principles
ACPO have published the Good Practice Guide for the recovery of computer-
based electronic evidence (Association of Chief Police Officers of England, 2007).
In this document they identify four primary guidelines, which we summarise
here:
Principle 1: no action taken should change data held on an exhibit.
Principle 2: where a person finds it necessary to access original data held on an
exhibit that person must be competent to do so and be able to give evidence
explaining the relevance and the implications of their actions.
Principle 3: an audit trail of all processes applied to an exhibit should be
created and preserved. This should be repeatable to an independent third
party.
Principle 4: the person in charge of the investigation (the case officer) has
overall responsibility for ensuring that the law and these principles are ad-
hered to.
These principles influence many of the procedures followed when examining a
digital device. Thus, the acquisition stage must preserve and not alter the state of
the exhibit and thereby uphold Principle 1. Under certain circumstances, such as
when acquiring data from a corporate server, it is impractical to take the device
offline and so data from selected areas of the server must be captured. (Other
areas of the server may be inaccessible to the suspect, so are not required for
the investigation.) To adhere to Principle 2, the impact of these actions must be
known and should only be undertaken by a competent person. When identifying
and evaluating evidence a comprehensive set of contemporaneous notes must be
made in order to record and document the processing of an exhibit, in accordance
with Principle 3.
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3.4 Professional accreditation
Digital forensics is a new and developing field, and is increasingly recognised as
a scientific discipline in its own right. More and more organisations are offering
services, seminars, courses and accreditation in an effort to define and become
the de facto standard in this specialised market.
This open market approach has led to a number of problems for managers
of forensic units and staff, particularly within the court system of England and
Wales. First, there is no single and mandatory regulatory body to provide a line
of professional accountability for digital forensics specialists. Professional ac-
countability is of vital importance for practitioners, particularly when liaising
with other professionals and institutions. Practising lawyers, for example, are an-
swerable to the Bar Standards Board and medical doctors are answerable to the
British Medical Association (BMA).
Second, there is no digital forensics professional qualification that is univer-
sally recognised as the professional standard. For example, professional engi-
neers are frequently expected to possess Chartered Engineer (CEng) status; this
is a recognised standard for engineering, but for digital forensics there are at
present two registers (and both are optional), one within the Council for the Reg-
istration of Forensic Practitioners and the other being developed by Skills for
Justice.
There is also no single nationwide training programme for digital forensics
specialists. The implications of this are significant. First, there is no nationally
agreed career path for a digital forensic examiner, and therefore no way of es-
tablishing that an individual is ‘qualified’ to practise. Second, there is no ‘best
practice’ or industry standard on how to undertake the various processes used to
analyse digital data.
Currently, it is left very much up to the court to accept the credentials and
experience of an individual prior to accepting their evidence in court. This can
and does lead to a forensic examiner’s credibility being challenged in an attempt
to have their testimony rejected by the court. The primary cause of this situation
is the infancy of the field. From a law enforcement perspective, investigations
involving the forensic analysis of computers began around 1997 with Kent Police
establishing one of the first hi tech crime units in the country. More recently, the
UK’s National High-Tech Crime Training Centre (now part of the National Police
Improvement Agency, the NPIA) has developed a number of training courses in
forensic data investigation and internet investigation (at initial, intermediate and
advanced levels) for investigators working both in the UK and further afield. The
intention is to develop a common training model for high tech crime investigation
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training throughout Europe, and a linked professional register of recognised high
tech crime investigators (Bryant and Jones, 2005).
3.4.1 Council for the Registration of Forensic Practitioners
The Council for the Registration of Forensic Practitioners (CRFP) was estab-
lished in 1999. It is a non-profit making organisation (subsidised by a grant from
the Home Office) and is independent of the Government. The Council’s remit is
to maintain a register of currently competent forensic practitioners and to ensure
that registered practitioners stay up to date and maintain their level of com-
petence. Initially, the register only covered the mainstream forensic specialties
of science, fingerprints and scene examination, but it has been extended more
recently and now includes forensic medicine, road transport investigation and
fire-scene examination. Within digital forensics, the CRFP identify three pro-
cesses; namely: Data capture; Data examination; and Data evaluation.
Data capture is the retrieval of data using forensically sound processes coupled
with the creation of systems to verify the data captured. Software products such as
Guidance Software’s EnCase and Access Data’s Forensic Toolkit (FTK) perform
these two steps in one process.
The data examination role relates to the identification and examination of rele-
vant data in an investigation. In addition, the CRFP also consider the production
of exhibits (to assist the court) to be part of this role.
The data evaluation role encompasses the assessment of data in its context and
assesses the significance of the data for the case in question. The forensic prac-
titioner is also equipped to draw deductions from the data and consider alternative
hypotheses.
A digital investigator may apply to join the CRFP register. The CRFP applica-
tion process (at the time of writing) considers the skills of a practitioner in terms
of these three roles (data capture, examination and evaluation). The application
involves two separate application packs; ‘Computer Examination’ and ‘Com-
puters’. The data capture and examination roles fall under the Computer Exami-
nation category, as they are considered to use investigative skills. Data evaluation,
which is considered to use higher level skills (similar to the skills possessed by a
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Lead assessor informs CRFP that 
registration is recommended. 
Lead assessor appoints a 
second speciality assessor to 
assess the application. 
Second speciality 
assessor recommends 
registration.
Lead assessor informs CRFP that 
registration is not recommended. 
Registration is not 
recommended. 
Lead assessor identifies speciality assessor 
 to review cases listed in the references. 
Lead assessor reviews the 
assessments from both 
speciality assessors.
Speciality assessor requests further details on a number of cases, 
in order to carry out  a more detailed assessment. 
Speciality assessor 
recommends 
registration.
Registration is not 
recommended. 
Figure 3.4 Applying for CRFP registration
forensic scientist or an engineer) is covered by the Computers application pack.
A forensic examiner who undertakes all three roles (data capture, examination
and evaluation) must therefore complete two application packs.
Each application is processed in three stages. In the first stage (Initial Applica-
tion), the applicant returns the completed application pack(s) to the CRFP, who
then obtain the relevant references for the lead assessor. The second and third
stages of the application process (Further Information and Final Assessment) are
shown in figure 3.4.
A successful applicant will be granted registration for 4 years. After this time
has elapsed the renewal of their registration will depend upon their ability to
demonstrate that they have remained up to date and maintained their competence.
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In addition, the investigator’s recent casework will be subjected to a further formal
assessment.
Despite being based upon a system of peer review, the Seventh Report by the
Select Committee on Science and Technology (Great Britain. House of Commons
Science and Technology Select Committee, 2005) identified a number of potential
issues with the Register. Under the present system, the discredited expert witness
Professor Meadow would probably have had no difficulty in obtaining CRFP
registration. Professor Meadow found himself in this situation largely due to the
fact that he gave evidence in an area that was not his specialty. Solicitors and policy
advisors for the CPS have also voiced concerns over the registration process as it
stands, citing that there is no ‘remit of evidence-based practice’ and that it should
not become a ‘panacea for exercising a judge’s discretion’.
The independent auditing of the assessment processes for granting initial ac-
creditation and renewal of accreditation is called for, but digital forensics is a
small field (compared to more established information technology based fields
such as Artificial Intelligence or Software Engineering) and so the number of
specialists is inevitably small. Independent auditing would consequently be diffi-
cult to arrange. As pointed out by the report, for small specialist communities like
CRFP, it is inevitable that such a register will have a limited validity; members
of such communities are all responsible for accrediting each other.
3.4.2 Skills for Justice
A key remit for the relevant Sector Skills Council, Skills for Justice (SfJ),
is the introduction of National Occupational Standards (NOS). These stan-
dards measure an individual’s competence by assessing performance in terms
of nationally agreed outcomes. In terms of the investigation of digital crime,
the relevant NOS are to be found within the ‘Countering E-Crime’ suite of
competencies.
The Countering E-Crime NOS introduced by SfJ (after extensive consulta-
tion with representative employer organisations) comprises of eight units; two
mandatory, one mandatory–optional and five optional.
Mandatory Units Identify and secure electronic evidence sources. Health and safety in ICT and Contact Centres.
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Mandatory-Optional Units (at least one must be completed) Seize and record electronic evidence sources. Capture and preserve electronic evidence.
Optional Units (at least five must be completed) Seize and record electronic evidence sources. Capture and preserve electronic evidence. Investigate electronic evidence. Evaluate and report electronic evidence. Conduct internet investigations. Conduct network investigations. Working with ICT hardware and equipment. Technical advice and guidance. Security of ICT systems (Skills for Justice, 2007).
The modular, competence based approach to assessment mirrors the founda-
tions of National Vocational Qualifications (NVQs) and Scottish Vocational
Qualifications (SVQs). This approach also makes it relatively straightforward
to identify areas that need further development. The distinguishing characteris-
tics that define a successful performance (within an established role such as digital
forensics) are known as competencies, reports Wolfe (1998). Any combination
of knowledge, skill, traits, values/beliefs, motives, and physical ability can be
assessed.
Competence based assessment is viewed by many organisations as a more
suitable tool to assess workplace skills than traditional academic qualifica-
tions alone. Their modular nature makes them scaleable, meaning that as new
roles are created within an organisation, appropriate competencies for the new
role can be chosen from existing competencies, and additional competencies
can be added to distinguish the new role from the existing role(s). Concerns
however have been expressed within the academic community concerning the
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‘box-ticking’ nature and general limitations of competencies based learning and
assessment.
3.4.3 Models for professional accreditation
There is currently no professional body for digital forensic investigators and allied
occupations. The establishment of a mandatory regulatory body, with the authority
to issue a license to practise would help define the standards and level of expertise
required of a digital forensics specialist, and courts would be likely to have greater
confidence in the skills, experience and accountability of an individual specialist.
It would seem rational to suppose that such a regulatory body would be led by a
single voice. Without clear leadership, it is likely that prolonged debate concerning
the mechanisms for arranging peer review would inevitably dilute the credibility
of any professional body, defeating its very purpose.
Many professional bodies also have close ties not only with industry, but also
with current research and development in order to keep abreast of the latest
scientific knowledge and recommendations for best practice. The advantages for
a field such as digital forensics are obvious. A regulatory body overseeing digital
forensics could also cater for those with and without a higher education; the
personnel working in high tech crime units within the police forces of England
and Wales comprise of a mixture of both police officers and civilians with a wide
range of skills and educational backgrounds.
The fingerprints service might be considered as a possible model for both
professional accountability and accreditation within the forensics arena; it might
provide a positive role model for other digital forensics specialities. In terms of
an individual’s professional accountability, fingerprints specialists are regulated
by the National Fingerprint Board (NFB) which is made up of senior operational
police officers, Home Office representatives and senior forensic practitioners.
Standards, performance, training are all areas under the remit of the NFB.
As Mike Thompson, Head of National Fingerprint Training for Centrex (now
NPIA) describes (BBC, 2006), the NFB is a regulatory body that has a mandate
to enforce compliance throughout the service. A prospective fingerprint expert
can expect their training to be evaluated and assessed to ensure that competence
is fully proven before they can be recognised and registered as an expert. There
is an ongoing process of continuous improvement and development and regular
competence testing to demonstrate continuing practical competence on the part
of the practitioner.
FO
R 
SC
RE
EN
 V
IE
W
IN
G
 IN
 B
PA
 O
NL
Y
OTE/SPH OTE/SPH
JWBK149-03 March 25, 2008 15:45 Char Count= 0
70 CH 3 INVESTIGATING DIGITAL CRIME
Digital Forensic Investigation
Robin Bryant
Investigating digital crime does not, of itself, mean that a digital forensic
investigation will be undertaken. Some digital crimes, such as identity fraud
where the suspect uses the internet as a source of information and a means to
commit the crime, could feasibly be investigated entirely successfully using
traditional and well established investigative techniques. However, many
digital crimes also require a specialised and parallel form of digital forensic
investigation. (We use the word ‘forensic’ here beyond its normal meaning
of ‘pertaining to the courts’ to embrace a wider sense of scientifically-based
methodologies).
The diagram below illustrates both some of the usual components of digital
forensic investigation (shown in shaded boxes) although by no means all
will be used in any particular investigation, together with some indication of
investigative methods that span two or more subfields.
Conditional 
Access forensics  
e.g. smart card 
and biometrics 
Forensic 
cryptography 
e.g. steganalyis. 
DIGITAL
FORENSIC
INVESTIGATION
Network and 
server forensics 
e.g. internet 
forensics. 
Legacy Data 
Storage forensics 
e.g. tape and floppy 
discs. 
Computer forensics
e.g. hard drive 
analysis. 
Mobile phone forensics 
e.g. cell site analysis. 
E.g.
encrypted 
hard drives. 
E.g.
unauthorised
access to pay 
services ('Yes 
cards'). 
Alternative Data Storage 
forensics 
e.g. GPS devices, digital 
cameras, USB sticks,  vehicle 
'computers', photocopiers and 
fax machines. E.g. deleted SIM 
card entries. 
E.g. email 
analysis. 
Volatile Memory 
forensics 
e.g. capture of data 
from 'live' systems. 
Figure 3.5 Specialist fields within digital forensic investigation
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The credibility of a digital forensic analyst needs to be proven and less open
to challenge, particularly given the weight that can be placed upon the digital
evidence by the courts. Mechanisms need to be put in place for the review of the
practices, procedures and performance for the field of study covered by a particular
digital forensic analyst. In addition, the training of staff and the maintaining of
standards should be demonstrable; a mandatory regulatory body could provide
such mechanisms.
3.5 Digital evidence in the courts
The Office of Science and Technology states that any technical process applied
to digital evidence ‘does not have to pass any formal test’ for it to be placed
before a court (Great Britain. Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology,
2005). This may seem alarmingly imprecise, but it has certain advantages; a trial
judge has the power to admit or decline a particular piece of evidence, and this
flexibility allows a court to take advantage of the very latest developments in the
digital forensics field.
3.5.1 Presenting digital evidence in court
The Forensic Examiner prepares a statement which is submitted to the Crown
Prosecution Service (CPS), and copies are distributed to both the prosecution and
defence counsel. The statement explains the examiner’s findings and proposes
a variety of strategies and the legal points to prove. It should not be just an
unbiased and technically accurate document describing the outcome of a forensic
examination; explanation and guidance should also be provided, in terms which
are comprehensible to the court and witnesses.
The Forensic Examiner’s primary role (as for most witnesses summoned to
a court within England and Wales) is to assist the court. However, given both
the technical complexity of the evidence and the examiner’s level of expertise
and experience, they are also frequently called upon to interpret the evidence. As
Johnston and Hutton (2004) point out, the primary purpose of the statement is to
assist the court in evaluating the admissibility and weight of any evidence found
on the digital devices examined for the case.
Arguably the most important area to cover when presenting digital evidence
to a court is that of continuity. It is absolutely critical to be able to account
for what happened to an exhibit such as a computer from the moment it was
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seized to the moment it was examined by a forensic examiner. Any gaps in this
chain of evidence could mean that one or more unknown persons could have had
access to the exhibit and thus have potentially interfered with its integrity. Such
discrepancies provide an easy target for defence counsel to discredit the evidence.
Under UK Law each offence has what are known as ‘points to prove’. For
example, under s 3 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 a person is guilty of unau-
thorised modification of computer material if it can be proven that he or she:
(a) does any act which causes an unauthorised modification of the contents of
any computer; and
(b) at the time when the act was performed he or she has the requisite intent and
the requisite knowledge to do so.
These two points demonstrate what in legal terms is called the actus reus (guilty
act) and the mens rea (intent/knowledge) of the individual.
If the evidence submitted by a digital forensics examiner is unclear or is contra-
dicted by other evidence, the court may move to reject the examiner’s evidence.
R. v. Cannings (2004) (which passed judgement on Angela Canning’s success-
ful appeal against her conviction for murdering her two baby sons) it was stated
that ‘If the outcome of the trial depends exclusively, or almost exclusively, on
a serious disagreement between distinguished and reputable experts, it will of-
ten be unwise, and therefore, unsafe to proceed’ (R. v. Cannings [2004] 1 All
E. R. 725).
3.5.2 Interpretation of evidence by a jury
The jury hear first the evidence of the forensic examiner as interpreted by the
prosecution counsel, so it is vital that the counsel has a clear understanding of the
evidence, and can communicate the key points to the jury effectively. Thus it is
essential for the forensic examiner to liaise with the prosecution counsel prior to
going to court, in order to check their interpretation of the facts. Such meetings,
when they occur, usually take place just prior to going into court, and often only
an hour at most after the prosecutor has first seen the digital forensic examiner’s
statement. Where appropriate, counsel is offered a carefully selected analogy to
assist in the comprehension of such data.
There is a school of thought that the juries in cases involving complex digital
evidence should be selected from among suitable technically qualified people. The
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British Computer Society (2000) proposed this measure in a submission paper.
Such a radical measure would need careful consideration as to a suitable means of
establishing the degree to which a jury (under the current system) understood and
appreciated the significance of evidence concerning digital devices or processes.
However, conducting such research inevitably presents difficulties, as identified
by section 7 of a report by the House of Commons Science and Technology
Select Committee (2005) which states that ‘section 8 of the Contempt of Court
Act 1981 and the related common law assures the confidentiality of a jury’s de-
liberations and precludes research into these deliberations’ (Great Britain. House
of Commons Science and Technology Select Committee, 2005, para 164).
3.5.3 Countering a defence
One of the responsibilities of the digital forensic examiner on the prosecution team
is to identify and evaluate possible areas of defence that may arise. Probably the
most common defence identified at the police interview stage of an investigation
is that of a Trojan or ‘pop-up’ being responsible for the presence of any illegal
material on the computer in question. Kennedy (2006) discusses a process that
may be followed to investigate the presence and impact of malware.
In some situations a defendant may assert that evidence found on their computer
was unsolicited and was ‘pushed’ to them via MSN, a peer-to-peer application
such as Kazaa (or a BitTorrent client) or perhaps by email. These scenarios can
be substantiated or refuted through investigation of the computer and how it has
been used. Similar techniques can be applied to investigate claims of ‘curiosity’
when for example, indecent images of children are found on a computer.
The defence may argue that proper procedures have not been followed;
procedure is important and must be strictly followed during a digital forensic
examination. By keeping contemporaneous notes of all actions performed (par-
ticularly in relation to the technical processes followed) it is possible to demon-
strate that an empirical approach has been taken to the examination of an exhibit
and data contained within it. Although such notes will not find their way into a
statement in their entirety they should include any areas of the ACPO guidelines
that might need to be evidenced. Thus, when capturing a forensic copy of a hard
disk for example, it should be recorded that the process was performed using a
hardware write blocking device, and ideally record the device’s manufacturer,
model and serial number.
If there is a significant difference between the total number of sectors on a hard
disk indicated by the label and the number of sectors reported by the analysis tool,
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an explanation for this difference should be provided in the statement. Without
this the defence could argue that the evidence that vindicates their client is located
in this ‘missing’ area.
3.6 Ethical issues
Digital forensics practitioners (unlike many generalist practitioners) possess the
skills to access areas of a hard disk normally hidden to the other users, and this may
present ethical dilemmas that can prove difficult to navigate. For example, whilst
working on a high profile case a practitioner may be subject to peer pressure to
release personal details of the offender to police colleagues and other investigators.
The privacy of the offender or client must be maintained in exactly the same way
a GP maintains the privacy of a patient, reports ComputerForensics1 (2006). For
example, if a hard disk from a lawyer’s office is being examined, any records
of communications between the lawyer and the client are subject to what is
known as ‘legal privilege’. This means that such communications are regarded
as confidential and must not even be examined, let alone used evidentially by a
digital forensics practitioner. These privacy issues can be difficult to untangle at
times as it is not always possible to confine an investigation to just one individual.
For example, log files or emails between parties will by their very nature contain
details such as access times and email accounts of innocent third parties.
It is not difficult to see that, like a locksmith, the digital forensic practitioner’s
skills can be put to misuse. In privately owned companies the use and misuse of
such skills becomes more significant, reports Stahl (2006). Employers may natu-
rally desire information about their employees, and a digital forensics practitioner
may be under immense pressure to reveal particular details stored in a digital ev-
idence source. A practitioner who submits to such pressure may stray into the
realm of surveillance in the workplace; this is explored in some depth by Stahl
et al. (2005).
Ethical issues should be explored alongside the provision of ethical guidance
during the education and training of a practitioner, but it is not enough to sim-
ply ‘bolt on’ an extra subject to be covered within a digital forensics training
programme. The bolt-on approach has the effect of isolating the principles, and
seems to imply that it might be optional for the individual to take the concepts on
board. Erbacher and Swart (2002) argue that changes in attitude such as ethics are
best brought about by regularly integrating ethical considerations and discussions
into all aspects of the specialty as a whole.
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3.7 Professional development for digital forensics
Establishing digital forensics as a profession is an area explored by Stahl (2006),
and would, Stahl asserts, provide guidance for members in the principles upheld
by the profession, including ethics. As a professional body, a code of conduct can
be established that embodies the expected behaviour of the profession in relation
to third parties. This reduces pressure on individuals to behave in way they feel
violates the principles upheld by the profession.
Stahl (2006) goes on to point out that, traditionally, members of a profession
such as medicine and law are known and respected for their independence and
autonomy. Employees within the newer professions such as the various flavours
of information communications technology are typically employed by large com-
mercial organisations. In these circumstances, the ethical priorities of the profes-
sion inevitably compete with the commercial priorities of the organisation. When
a conflict of interest occurs it is likely the professional requirements will take
second place to the commercial requirements.
The digital forensics practitioner must reflect upon the position they hold in
society; they are in positions of considerable trust and power. For those working
in law enforcement, there are times where the reputation and very liberty of peo-
ple under investigation can depend solely upon the findings of the practitioner’s
examination.
Questions
Robin Bryant & Sarah Bryant
1. What is ‘volatile memory’? How can the forensic ‘capture’ of the remains of
volatile memory be reconciled with current good practice guidelines for the
‘first responder’? (Compare the ‘safe shutdown school’ with the ‘live analysis
school’).
2. What is a ‘session cookie’ and why might they be of interest to a forensic
investigator?
3. In a criminal case, how could the ‘trojan defence’ be rebutted?
4. Describe how digital technology may contribute to the commission of a 419
scam.
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5. What is the system for validating digital forensic software tools in (a) the
UK, (b) the US?
6. Why might it be important to use a write blocking device in the course of a
digital investigation?
7. What information is stored in a file called ’index.dat’ on a PC (as used by the
Microsoft web browser Internet Explorer)? Why might this information be of
forensic interest?
8. What are the four principles ACPO recommends for any digital investigation?
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